It's easy to get caught up in the rhetoric of Japanese conservatives and view Japan on a course toward "normalization" but when you really think about it, it is not that simple. Instead of thinking of Japan as "normalizing" it's better to think of Japan in its current state as "normal." What does that mean?
Japan operates differently from other countries; that point is obvious with Article 9 (the "peace" clause of the Japanese Constitution). It is usually argued that Japan is slipping down the path toward revising Article 9 and establishing a bona fide army. If they don't go that far, as Richard Samuels of MIT says in Securing Japan (2007), Japan will form a "Goldilocks consensus" like was made in the 1950s under PM Yoshida Shigeru.
Why? The Japanese conservatives have been "slicing" the Yoshida "Doctrine" (more of a compromise than a doctrine per se) with, in Andrew Oros' term, "reach, reach and reach" for a more "normal" country with a military (under civilian rule of course). This reaching can be seen from PM Kishi Nobusuke to PM Nakasone Yasuhiro to PM Koizumi Junichiro or even PM Abe Shinzo (just to name a few). I mentioned these because under Kishi the US-Japanese security agreement was signed in 1960; Nakasone was to spend more than 1 percent of GNP on defense; Koizumi sent the JSDF to the Indian Ocean; and Abe upgraded the status of the Japan Defense Agency (防衛庁) to the Ministry of Defense (防衛省）.
All of this "reach, reach, and reaching" for more and more would make it appear that Japan is slipping down the slope toward a militarized, "normal" nation.
Yet, they have not changed Article 9 and established a bona fide army yet.
Dr. Oros says, in the line of the scholars Peter J. Katzenstein and Thomas Berger before him, that there are restraints on Japanese foreign policy options that must be considered. Instead of "reach, reach, and reach" it is "reach, react, and reassure." Every time there is a reach such as the ones described above, there has been a considerable reaction. Kishi signed the agreement and barely escaped with his life with hundreds of protesters trying to prevent the signing (Eisenhower was supposed to go, but was told not to because of the expected demonstrations). Similar stories can be told about the rest, but it would take time to look up the public opinion polls and Diet debates that took place each time a "reach" was made.
The final step is "reassure" because the problem does not go away until sufficient measures are taken. In 1960, Japan, under the PM that followed Kishi PM Ikeda Hayato, followed a path toward becoming an economic (and not military) giant. The Nakasone budget was quickly brought back down to 1% (it is currently below 1% and falling). The Indian Ocean re-fuelling missions have been highly controversial (were limited in the first place with time restraints etc.) and were even repealed for a time. The Ministry of Defense now exists, but it's too early to tell what role it will play. One thing stands for certain, that Japan is with every passing year becoming less of an economic giant and has to consider that when deciding where to place its resources. Since the MOD came into existence in 2007, defense expenditures have been falling.
Time will only tell how Japanese defense plays out, but analysis that focuses squarely on results (individual laws and policies) ignores too much by leaving out the process.
The bottom line is that Japan has changed since it regained independence from the US in 1952, but the dialogue that creates its policies hasn't changed that much. For the time being, any attempt to place Japan's young men in the line of fire will be hard-pressed to pass the Diet. Something to consider when plotting Japan down a course toward Article 9 revision.
Works Cited
Oros, Andrew. Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity, and the Evolution of Security Practice. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 2007.
Samuels, Richard. Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 2007.
